This paper examines the welfare cost of rare housing disasters characterized by large drops in house prices. I construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with recursive preferences and housing disaster shocks. The likelihood and magnitude of housing disasters are inferred from historic housing market experiences in the OECD. The model shows that despite the rarity of housing disasters, Canadian households would willingly give up 5 percent of their non-housing consumption each year to eliminate the housing disaster risk. The evaluation of this risk, however, varies considerably across age groups, with a welfare cost as high as 10 percent of annual non-housing consumption for the old, but near zero for the young. This asymmetry stems from the fact that, compared to the old, younger households suffer less from house price declines in disaster periods, due to smaller holdings of housing assets, and benefit from lower house prices in normal periods, due to the negative price effect of disaster risk.
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, house prices have increased signi…cantly in Canada, as shown in Figure  1 . 1 This ongoing housing boom has become an important consideration for the conduct of monetary policy and …nancial regulation, 2 since currently high levels of house prices are potentially increasing the risk of a large housing market correction, which could have a devastating impact on the macroeconomy, as recently seen in the United States. This paper investigates the likelihood and magnitude of housing market disasters, de…ned as large drops in house prices, and the value of limiting this disaster risk for the Canadian economy. I …nd that although housing market disasters are rare events from a statistical perspective, their macroeconomic e¤ects are so large that they have signi…cant welfare implications. Estimating the likelihood and magnitude of housing market disasters is di¢ cult because those disasters are infrequent and house price series are short for many countries. To address the data scarcity problem, this paper adopts a method similar in spirit to Barro (2006) and uses cross-country housing market experiences in the OECD. 3 In particular, I use house price data for twenty OECD countries reported in the property price statistics by the Bank for International Settlements with appropriate in ‡ation adjustments. The paper de…nes a housing market disaster as cumulative peak-to-trough declines in real house prices of 20 percent or more. I …nd that in a given OECD country, housing market disasters occur with a probability of 3 percent every year, corresponding to about one disaster every 34 years. 4 A housing disaster on average lasts about 6.4 years, and house price declines range between 24 and 68 percent, with an average of about 34 percent.
To quantify both the aggregate and distributional welfare impact of this housing disaster risk, I construct an overlapping generations (OLG) general equilibrium model with recursive preferences and housing disaster shocks. The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of households, a representative …rm and a government. There are two asset markets in the economy, namely, a …nancial market and a housing market. Households have Epstein-Zin preferences over consumption goods and housing services. The …rm rents capital and employs labor to produce a numeraire good used for both consumption and investment. Households trade a one-period bond in the …nancial market and a durable housing asset in the housing market. Houses in the paper have the role of providing housing services, and serving as an asset and collateral. The economy is subject to aggregate housing disaster shocks modeled as housing depreciation shocks, similar to Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) . These shocks can be interpreted as shocks to the quality of houses, which help generate large drops in house prices. I calibrate the parameters characterizing the properties of housing depreciation shocks to match the average historical house price decline during OECD house price crash episodes, and the rest of the benchmark model to match the recent Canadian data over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . The welfare cost associated with the housing disaster risk is measured as the percentage change in the consumption of non-housing goods households would willingly give up in an otherwise-identical no-disaster economy in order to be as well o¤ as living in the benchmark economy.
The main …ndings from the model are twofold. First, despite their rarity, the aggregate welfare cost of housing disasters is large, since Canadian households would be willing to give up around 5 percent of their non-housing consumption each year to eliminate the housing disaster risk. Compared to the no-disaster economy, the presence of this disaster risk has two opposite welfare e¤ects on households. On the one hand, due to a wealth e¤ect, a realized housing disaster leads to a long-lasting economic recession. The loss in housing wealth once a disaster occurs reduces the aggregate household savings and thus the capital supply. As a consequence, the interest rate goes up and the …rm cuts back its investment, leading to declines in wages, output and consumption. On the other hand, due to a substitution e¤ect, a non-trivial disaster probability results in risk-averse households'resource reallocation from the housing sector to the production sector in normal periods. This lowers both house prices and the interest rate, with declining borrowing costs leading to higher investment, output and consumption. However, due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption, the welfare gain from this resource reallocation in normal periods is dominated by the welfare loss from large recessions triggered by housing disasters, explaining why the society is willing to devote a sizable amount of resources to eliminating this disaster risk.
The second major …nding is that the welfare evaluation of the housing disaster risk di¤ers considerably in magnitude across age groups, with a welfare cost as high as 10 percent of annual non-housing consumption for the old, but near zero for the young. This asymmetry is mainly due to the hump-shaped pro…le of life-cycle housing consumption, with older households typically holding more housing assets than the young. In disaster periods, declines in house prices favor the young, who purchase houses at depressed prices, but hurt the old, who rely on house sales to …nance non-housing consumption. In normal periods, younger households also bene…t more than the old from purchasing houses at lower cost, thanks to the resource reallocation from the housing sector to the production sector as discussed above. Therefore, younger households are less averse to the presence of the housing disaster risk than the old. This paper is mostly related to two strands of the literature. The …rst strand studies the implications of rare disaster risks for asset prices, business cycles and welfare. Examples include Rietz (1988 . My paper contributes to this literature by focusing on rare disasters related to housing markets with a careful examination of their welfare implications. The rare disaster hypothesis was …rst proposed by Rietz (1988) , who argues that including a low-probability disaster state has a signi…cant impact on asset pricing, and can resolve the well-known equity premium puzzle. However, partly due to the skepticism of the likelihood and sizes of disaster events, this hypothesis did not receive a lot of attention in the profession until Barro (2006) , who shows that income disasters have been frequent and large enough to justify Rietz's hypothesis and its accountability of the high equity premium. Subsequent papers such as Gabaix (2012) , Gourio (2012) , and Wachter (2013) …nd that incorporating time-varying probability and severity of disasters into the disaster hypothesis can help resolve a number of important puzzles in both macroeconomics and …nance. Barro (2009) extends the cost-of-business-cycle literature starting from Lucas (1987) to rare disasters as documented in Barro (2006) , and …nds that their welfare cost is near a 20 percent drop in GDP every year. Instead of using the historical data on drops in GDP, Pindyck and Wang (2013) infer the statistical properties of the income disaster risk from economic and …nancial variables, and …nd that society is willing to pay a consumption tax of over 50 percent to eliminate this jump risk. Glover et al. (2014) examine the distributional consequences of the Great Recession, and …nd that a big negative technological shock hurts the old more than the young as a result of larger declines in equity prices relative to wages. This paper is also related to the literature studying the implications of housing for the Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) , both of which study the impact of aggregate uncertainty on housing markets. The former paper …nds that ‡uctuations in the U.S. price-rent ratio since the late 1990s are driven by changing risk premia in response to aggregate shocks and …nancial market liberalization, whereas the latter studies the life-cycle and business-cycle properties of housing and debt. In contrast to these two papers focusing on business-cycle-type technological shocks, my paper examines the e¤ects of relatively rare disaster-type market-speci…c shocks on the macroeconomy. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and de…nes the equilibrium. Section 3 estimates the likelihood and magnitude of housing market disasters from the OECD and calibrates the benchmark model to the Canadian data. Section 4 investigates the welfare impact of the housing disaster risk as well as its macroeconomic implications. Section 5 concludes. Computational details on solving the model are contained in the appendix.
The Model
This section constructs a stochastic OLG general equilibrium economy, populated by overlapping generations of households, a representative …rm and a government. Households supply their time and capital to the …rm for its production of a numeraire non-housing good used for both consumption and investment. They also trade a bond in a …nancial market and a durable housing asset in a housing market. The economy is subject to rare housing disaster shocks.
Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of households who are ex-ante heterogeneous. Let j 2 J = f1; :::; j ; :::; jg denote the age of a household, where the …rst period is when the household starts earning labor income, j denotes a mandatory retirement age, and j stands for the maximum number of periods a household can live. In each period, a household faces an exogenous mortality risk. The survival probability to age j + 1, conditional on being alive at age j, is denoted by j 2 [0; 1], with 0 = 1 and j = 0. This probability is assumed to be identical across households of the same age. There does not exist an annuity market for the mortality risk, so households cannot insure themselves against the risk. The model assumes that the total amount of wealth left by households who die in a given period is collected by the government and used for public consumption.
The population grows at rate n and the associated age distribution 1 ; :::; j is assumed to be …xed over time such that P j j=1 j = 1 with j+1 = j j 1 + n ; j = 1; :::; j 1;
where j > 0 denotes the share of the age-j group in the total population.
Preferences
Households have Epstein-Zin preferences over consumption good (c) and housing service (h) as
where is the discount factor, is the Cobb-Douglas aggregator between the numeraire consumption good and the housing service, is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), and is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. 5 Constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility is a special case when = . 6 The expectation operator E j;t is conditional on the information available at time t for a household at age j, and expectations are formed with respect to the stochastic processes governing mortality and other shocks to be described later. It is assumed that there exists a linear technology that transforms one unit of housing stock 5 The Cobb-Douglas aggregation between non-housing good and housing service is widely used in the housing literature. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) argue that Cobb-Douglas aggregation functions, which imply a unit elasticity between housing and non-housing goods, are an empirically reasonable choice. 6 As pointed out in previous studies, such as Bansal and Yaron (2004) , Barro (2009) , and Gourio (2012), Epstein-Zin preferences, which separate risk aversion and IES, allow standard asset pricing models to overcome the notable defect associated with CRRA preferences that an increase in aggregate uncertainty raises stock prices.
at the beginning of each period into one unit of housing service in that period. I also assume that households do not leave voluntary bequests upon their death, with the associated period utility normalized to zero for simplicity.
Endowment
Each period, households are endowed with one unit of time which is fully supplied to the …rm for production, since they do not value leisure in the model. Households di¤er in their labor productivity over the life cycle, as re ‡ected in a typical hump-shaped earning pro…le. Denote as the age pro…le of productivity. Households at age j receive labor earning w t j , where w t is the market-determined wage at time t. I set j = 0 for j j , i.e., retirees are assumed to lose their productivity and no longer receive labor earnings. There is a pay-as-you-go social security program in the model, where workers pay payroll taxes from their labor earnings at rate and retirees receive the same amount of social security payment b t irrespective of their age. The retirement bene…t equals a fraction of average labor earnings to be discussed later. The program is self-…nancing and managed by the government in the economy.
In sum, the net earning of an age-j household at time t is equal to
where 1 A is an indicator function that takes value one when event A occurs and zero otherwise.
Production
The numeraire good is produced by a competitive …rm with a constant-returns-to-scale production technology:
where k t and l t are total capital and labor input at time t, and is the capital income share. The …rm rents capital at interest rate r t and employs labor at wage w t . Capital stock depreciates at rate k . Pro…t maximization implies that factors are paid their marginal product:
Market Arrangements
The economy consists of two asset markets, namely, a …nancial market and a housing market. In the …nancial market, households and …rms trade a one-period bond which pays an interest rate r t . Through the market, some households lend money to other households and the …rm.
Households also face a borrowing limit determined by the value of their houses. More precisely, denote a t+1 and h t+1 as a household's holdings of …nancial and housing assets for time t + 1, respectively, and p t as prevailing house prices at time t denominated in units of the numeraire consumption good. The household is subject to the following borrowing constraint:
Inequality (6) says that each period the household can borrow up to a fraction (1 ) of the value of its house in that period, where parameter can be interpreted as the down payment ratio. A positive a means that the household is a saver or a bond buyer and vice versa.
In the housing market, aggregate housing supply is …xed at h. 7 Houses are costly to maintain, since the consumption of housing services depreciates the housing stock. The periodic maintenance cost for a house of size h is h p t h, where h represents the proportional maintenance expense. The housing market is exposed to possible disastrous market crashes in the form of large drops in house prices. I assume that disaster shocks are identically and independently distributed, and arrive according to the following process:
h with probability h 0 with probability 1 h :
Each period, a disaster occurs with probability h , and is modeled as a proportional housing depreciation shockd h . The distribution F h of the random variabled h is supported on d h ; d h R ++ , and is calibrated to match the empirical distribution of house price declines in historical housing market disasters. Denote the range of the random variable d h;t as
Three remarks about the speci…cation (7) are in order. First, this paper does not model the causes of housing market disasters, but instead assumes that they follow some exogenous yet empirically estimated distribution, because the focus of the current paper is on quantifying the welfare impact of the housing disaster risk. Second, the housing depreciation shock is a parsimonious way to model a housing market disaster characterized by large drops in house prices. 9 A similar depreciation shock is used in Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) to study mortgage default over the business cycle. 10 Although the speci…cation of housing depreciation shocks is more realistic for wars or natural disasters, it can also be interpreted as shocks to the quality of existing houses by a¤ecting the e¤ective units of housing assets brought from the previous period. In the model, housing depreciation shocks essentially play the role of negative housing wealth shocks, with this feature broadly consistent with housing market disasters in practice. Third, speci…cation (7) does not consider continuous depreciation shocks in normal periods and thus ignores small ‡uctuations in house prices. This assumption is primarily made for model solvability, because taking into account those additional aggregate shocks would signi…cantly increase the computational burden for solving the current heterogeneous-agent model. However, it is reasonable to believe that the basic insights about the welfare implications of housing disasters obtained in this paper will remain largely una¤ected in more general settings.
The Households'Problem
All households are assumed to start their life with zero amount of …nancial assets and housing assets. At the beginning of each period t, a household observes the following …ve state variables: …nancial asset a j;t , housing asset h j;t , age j, realized disaster shock d h;t , and the distribution function t of households across (a j;t ; h j;t ; j) 2 A H J, where A R and H R + . Here, ( t ; d h;t ) characterizes the state of the economy at time t. Since the disaster shock d h;t is the only economic-wide shock in the model, the holdings of both …nancial and housing assets must be the same within each age group over time, provided that all households start their life with the same levels of …nancial assets and housing assets. As a result, the distribution t can be expressed as a discrete measure:
After observing the state (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ), the household chooses its non-housing consumption c j;t and new holdings of …nancial assets a j;t+1 and housing assets h j;t+1 to maximize its lifetime utility formulated in the following Bellman equation:
v (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ) = max c j;t ;h 0 j;t ;a 0 j;t 
0:
On the right-hand side of the budget equation (11), the …rst term e j;t is de…ned in (3) and it denotes the household's total earnings. The next two terms represent, respectively, the household's gross savings from the last period and the housing wealth after both physical and disasterinduced depreciation. Let c ( ), a 0 ( ) and h 0 ( ) be the optimal policy functions of the nonhousing consumption, …nancial position and housing position, respectively, and for simplicity denote c j;t = c (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ), a 0 j;t = a 0 (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ) and h 0 j;t = h 0 (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ).
Equilibrium
I next de…ne the recursive competitive equilibrium of this economy.
De…nition 1 Given a replacement rate and an initial distribution 0 , a recursive competitive equilibrium consists of prices fr t ; w t ; p t g; aggregate variables fk t ; l t g; a value function v (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ), optimal policy functions c (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ), a 0 (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ) and h 0 (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; t ; d h;t ); public policies f t ; b t ; g t g; and a transition function Q for with t+1 = Q ( t ; d h;t ) such that 1. Given prices r t , w t and p t , the value function v and policy functions c, a 0 and h 0 solve the household's utility maximization problem (10).
2. Given prices r t and w t , aggregates k t and l t solve the …rm's pro…t maximization problem by satisfying (5).
3. The social security program is self-…nancing:
4. Government expenditures equal accidental bequests:
5. Markets clear:
(a) Financial market clears:
(b) Housing market clears:
(c) Labor market clears:
(d) Goods market clears:
where
6. The transition function Q is consistent with individual behavior, i.e.,
where a 0 j 1;t = a 0 (a j 1;t ; h j 1;t ; j 1; t ; d h;t ) if j 2 and 0 if j = 1, and h 0 j 1;t is de…ned similarly.
The above de…nition is standard. For the social security program, the retirement bene…t b t is assumed to equal a fraction of average labor earnings, i.e.,
which is proportional to the wage rate w t . Equations (19) and (12) then imply the following time-invariant payroll tax rate:
As expected, the payroll tax rate increases with the replacement ratio and the population size of retirees relative to workers. The right-hand side of the government budget equation (13) represents the total wealth left by households who were alive yesterday but die today: the sum associated with a j;t represents the total …nancial wealth of those households, and that associated with p t h j;t represents their total housing wealth after depreciation.
For market clearing conditions, equation (14) says that the net supply of …nancial assets must equal the aggregate capital stock employed by the …rm. Meanwhile, since households supply all their time endowment to the …rm, equation (16) implies that the aggregate labor supply is constant over time and equals l = P j 1 j=1 j j , given j = 0 for j j . In the goods-market clearing equation (17), the four terms on the left-hand side represent, respectively, the aggregate non-housing consumption (c t ), investment in capital stock (i t ), government expenditure (g t ), and housing depreciation expenses (x t ).
Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model, where I estimate the parameters characterizing the likelihood and magnitude of housing market disasters using the historical OECD house price data, and the rest to match Canadian data over the period 2000-2012.
Demographics and Preferences
One period in the model is equivalent to …ve years. Households enter the model at age 20 (model age 1) and can live up to age 95 ( j = 16). Retirement is mandatory at age 65 (j = 10). The conditional survival probabilities is then computed using equation (1) .
For parameters characterizing preferences, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is set at 2, a value that lies in the middle of the range commonly used in the literature. The IES is set at 2, which implies that = 0:5. It is worth noting that although there is a large debate about the value of IES in the literature as empirical estimates …nd both high and low numbers, an IES smaller than one would have the counterfactual implication that higher uncertainty increases the prices of risky assets, as pointed out for instance in Barro (2009) and Gourio (2012) . In the quantitative exercise, the aggregator function of non-housing goods and housing services takes the form c (h + ")
1 . Here, " is an arbitrarily small positive number, making the utility function …nite when h = 0, which can be interpreted to mean that one can survive without a house but not without food. The aggregation parameter v is set at 0:9 in the baseline calibration, in line with the estimated share of non-housing consumption in total expenditure in the literature. I calibrate the time discount factor such that the implied steady-state equilibrium interest rate matches the mortgage interest rate in the data. The choice of this target is motivated by the fact that the discount factor directly a¤ects households'willingness to borrow and lend, and thus the interest rate. The average annualized real …ve-year mortgage rate is about 3:2 percent in Canada during the period from 2000 to 2012, which implies that = 0:9.
Endowment and Production
The no-disaster average labor productivity pro…le j : j 2 J is used to capture the typical hump-shaped earning pro…le over the life cycle. The age dependency of labor productivity is modeled by the following regression equation:
where " j is the associated residual term. The values of 1 and 2 are taken from Meh, Ríos-Rull and Terajima (2010), who estimate age-class speci…c labor endowments using the panel wage data of the 1999-2004 Survey of Labour Income Dynamics from Statistics Canada. The survey contains information on Canadian households regarding their labor supply and income over time. The age-dependent productivity j is approximated by the wage rate, which is de…ned by the total wage and salary income divided by the total hours worked. The estimated parameter values are 1 = 0:076 and 2 = 0:00085. The replacement rate is set at 0:4, which implies a payroll tax rate of 0:13 by (20) . I set the capital income share = 0:33, and the capital depreciation rate k = 0:1, in line with the average depreciation rate of the …xed non-residential capital stock in Canada since 2000.
Housing Market and Disaster Risks
For parameters that capture the housing market, I set the average down payment ratio = 0:15 in the benchmark model. This corresponds to a loan-to-value ratio of 0:85, in accordance with the average of the ratio in Canada in the past decade. The proportional home maintenance cost h is set at 0:05 in the baseline. The aggregate housing stock h is estimated as follows. I next describe the estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of housing market disasters based on historical housing market experiences in twenty OECD countries. 11 I …rst obtain the up-to-date nominal house price indices of the twenty countries from the property price statistics by the Bank for International Settlements, which in turn gathers the data from national sources. 12 These price indices are then de ‡ated using consumer price indices from the OECD.
In this paper, a housing market disaster is de…ned as cumulative peak-to-trough declines in real house prices of 20 percent or more. As shown in Table 1 , I identify 18 housing disasters in the 616 observation years for the twenty countries in the sample, where …fteen of the twenty countries have experienced at least one housing disaster, with Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom having undergone two. 13 This implies an unconditional probability of housing market disasters equal to 3 percent each year, corresponding to roughly one disaster per country every 34 years. A housing disaster is found to last about 6.4 years on average, and the magnitude of house price declines ranges between 24 and 68 percent, with an average of about 34 percent. As for the size distribution F h of the housing depreciation shockd h upon the occurrence of a disaster, I assume that it is generic. 14 More precisely, I calibrated h to be 4:8 such that the model-generated declines in house prices after a housing disaster hits the steady-state equilibrium equal the sample average of 34 percent.
Computation
I solve for the competitive equilibrium using the method developed by Smith (1997, 1998) , which has been widely used in the study of heterogeneous agent models with aggregate uncertainty. It is assumed that households are boundedly rational in the sense that they use only partial information to predict the law of motion for the state variables. More precisely, households use only a subset of the moments of the distribution t instead of the whole distribution to deduce prices. I postulate that the aggregate capital stock k t is a su¢ cient statistic to represent the distribution t , and the laws of motions of k t and house prices p t take the following functional forms:
where coe¢ cients f i (d h;t )g 4 i=1 are forecasting parameters associated with the aggregate disaster shock d h;t . Since d h;t takes only two values in the benchmark calibration, there are in total eight coe¢ cients to be estimated. With the above speci…cations, the recursive competitive equilibrium de…ned in the last section can be approximated by an otherwise-identical equilibrium, except that households solve the following optimization problem with partial information: v (a j;t ; h j;t ; j; k t ; d h;t ) = max 14 Barro and Jin (2011) and Pindyck and Wang (2013) explicitly model the size distributions of income disasters in a representative-agent framework. However, taking into account the size distribution of declines in house prices would greatly increase the computational cost for solving the current heterogeneous-agent model with aggregate uncertainty. Therefore, for model tractability, I assume a generic distribution in the calibration. subject to (22) , (23) and other standard constraints imposed for problem (10) . The resulting model-generated moments based on the approximate policy functions are simulated over a long period of time, and compared to those perceived by households. If they are close enough, then one obtains a good approximation of the equilibrium. Otherwise, one could try di¤erent functional forms for the forecasting functions (22) and (23), or include additional moments of the distribution t . The details of the computation scheme are described in the appendix. Figure 2 shows the model-simulated life-cycle pro…les of earnings adjusted for social security, non-housing consumption, housing consumption and …nancial assets in normal periods. The patterns of the pro…les resemble those documented in previous studies on the lifecycle consumption-saving behavior such as Yang (2009) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011). The upper-left panel shows that labor earnings exhibit a hump shape over the life, peaking at around age 45 and remaining equal to social security bene…ts after retirement. The upper-right and lower-left panels of the …gure plot, respectively, the age distributions of the consumption of non-housing goods and housing services, both of which display a hump-shaped pattern. 15 For example, households buy houses in their 20s to reap the bene…ts of housing service and collateral insurance. These two bene…ts of housing prevent households from downsizing their houses quickly until very late in life, when there comes a need to liquidate their housing wealth to …nance non-housing consumption. This hump-shape pattern of housing consumption suggests that a steep decline in house prices would likely hurt the old more than the young. Finally, the lower-right panel of the …gure shows a hump-shaped life-cycle pro…le of …nancial wealth. Households typically hold few …nancial assets when they are young, because of the down payment requirement for their housing purchase. After the purchase, they start saving in …nancial assets to prepare for retirement, with their …nancial wealth peaking at age 65. Once retired, households sell their …nancial assets to fund non-housing consumption.
The Welfare Impact of Housing Disasters
This section employs the calibrated model to quantify the welfare impact of the housing disaster risk on the Canadian economy. I …rst propose two welfare cost measures of housing disasters based on both speci…c age groups and the society as a whole. I then analyze the patterns of welfare implications derived from the benchmark model by examining the macroeconomic e¤ects of this disaster risk in both disaster and normal periods. I conclude this section with a sensitivity analysis of the welfare cost estimation.
Measuring the Welfare Cost
To measure the welfare cost of the housing disaster risk, I compare the welfare of the benchmark economy to that of an otherwise-identical no-disaster economy ( h = 0) based on a utilitarian welfare criterion. First, I measure the welfare impact of this disaster risk from the perspective of a speci…c age group. De…ne the ex-ante expected utility of a household at age j 2 J in the benchmark economy as
where the value function v is de…ned in (10) , and the expectation is taken over all possible combinations of the …nancial asset a j;t , the housing asset h j;t , the distribution t of households and the housing disaster shock d h;t in equilibrium. Here, V j can be interpreted as the long-run welfare of an age-j household. Note that the welfare criterion (25) is utilitarian, since it weighs lifetime utilities with their respective probabilities. 16 Next denote
as the lifetime utility of an age-j household in the no-disaster economy, associated with the optimal choices of non-housing goods, housing services and holding of …nancial assets c k ; h k ; a k : k j over remaining periods of life in the steady-state equilibrium, where v is the corresponding value function in the no-disaster economy. The welfare cost of the housing disaster risk from an age-j household's perspective is then measured by a uniform percentage decrease j in the consump-tion of non-housing goods that the household is willing to give up over remaining periods of life in the no-disaster economy in order to be as well o¤ as living in the benchmark economy. By the homotheticity of Epstein-Zin preferences (2), one has that
where j > (<)0 implies that eliminating the housing disaster risk is welfare increasing (decreasing) from the point of view of an age-j household. The second measure of the welfare impact of housing disasters is considered from an aggregate perspective. I de…ne the utilitarian social welfare in the benchmark economy as
where j is the share of age-j households in the total population and V j is de…ned in (25) . Here, V represents the average welfare of all the living households. Accordingly, the social welfare in the no-disaster economy can be written as
with V j given by (26) . The aggregate welfare cost of the housing disaster risk is measured by an age-independent uniform percentage decrease in the consumption of non-housing goods by all households in the no-disaster economy, such that the society is as well o¤ as in the benchmark economy. Similarly, the homotheticity of Epstein-Zin preferences implies that
Removing the housing disaster risk leads to a welfare gain for the society if is positive, and a welfare loss if is negative. The …rst row of Table 2 reports the welfare costs of the housing disaster risk based on the benchmark model. It shows that despite their rarity, the aggregate welfare cost of housing disasters is large, with = 0:0524, i.e., Canadian households are on average willing to give up 5:24 percent of their non-housing consumption each year in order to eliminate this disaster risk. Meanwhile, the welfare evaluation of this risk di¤ers considerably in magnitude across age groups, with a welfare cost as high as 10 percent of annual non-housing consumption for the old, but near zero for the young. More noticeable is that households in their 20s …nd the presence of this risk welfare bene…cial, which is equivalent to a uniform 1:19 percent increase in their non-housing consumption over the life cycle. This notable asymmetry in the evaluation of housing disasters across age groups suggests that households at di¤erent ages hold di¤erent attitudes toward the presence of this risk. To understand these patterns of the welfare implications of housing disasters, it is useful to fully investigate how the presence of this disaster risk impacts household life-cycle portfolio allocations, asset prices and quantities. Notes: In the benchmark, h = 0:03, = 2, = 0:5, v = 0:9, h = 1:41.
Analyzing the Welfare Implications
This subsection uses the benchmark model to examine the e¤ects of the existence of the housing disaster risk on the macroeconomy in both disaster and normal episodes. First, I study how macroeconomic aggregates and life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings and consumption respond to a realized housing disaster. To do so, I assume in the simulation that the sequence of aggregate disaster states involves a long period of normal times, a disaster hitting the housing market in period 1 and a return to normal times in subsequent periods. Figure 3 displays the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates after the disaster shock, which shows that a housing disaster leads to a long-lasting economic recession. During the disaster, house prices decline immediately, with the loss in housing wealth reducing the aggregate household savings and thus the capital supply. 17 The resulting higher interest rate discourages investment and labor hiring, which consequently leads to declines in wages, output and consumption. 18 After the disaster, the economy starts recovering, but it takes about …fty years to fully return to its pre-disaster state. Table 3 reports the responses of consumption and saving to the housing disaster shock across age groups, by computing the percentage change in the holdings of …nancial assets and the consumption of non-housing goods and housing services for di¤erent age groups right after the disaster. As seen in the …rst row of the table, holdings of …nancial assets decrease for nearly all age groups due to the large negative housing wealth shock, with the most pronounced decline observed for households in their 30s and 90s. The only exception are households in their 20s, who instead slightly increase their …nancial assets, because of decreased expenditures on housing purchases thanks to depressed house prices. The second row of the table shows that young and middle-aged households either upsize or keep their current houses, whereas old households downsize their houses, suggesting that the age distribution of housing consumption would spread out after the disaster. The asymmetric responses in housing consumption across age groups are due to the hump-shaped pro…le of life-cycle housing consumption. As seen in Figure 2 , old households typically hold more housing assets than their young and middle-aged counterparts, and they are also the main house sellers in the housing market as they become aged. A housing disaster forces them to decrease their holdings of housing assets in order to mitigate the negative wealth e¤ect on their non-housing consumption. In contrast, young and middle-aged households hold relatively fewer housing assets and are thus less a¤ected by drops in house prices. As a matter of fact, a large decline in house prices even induces young households in their 20s to upsize their houses in the disaster episode. The …nal row of Table 3 shows that non-housing consumption declines across all age groups, with the decline being most pronounced for older households because they are most exposed to the housing disaster. To sum up, due to the wealth e¤ect, a realized housing disaster leads to a large recession. However, younger households fare better than older households, because declines in house prices favor the young, who purchase houses at lower cost, but hurt the old, who rely on house sales to …nance non-housing consumption. Next, I study how the likelihood of having a disaster a¤ects the macroeconomy in normal periods. In Table 4 , I calculate the percentage di¤erences in macroeconomic aggregates relative to their counterparts in the no-disaster economy. 19 The table shows that the presence of the disaster risk has a sizable impact on macroeconomic aggregates in normal periods, with lower house prices and interest rate but higher wages, output, consumption and investment. This result is due to households'portfolio reallocation from housing to …nancial assets. When riskaverse households know there is a non-trivial likelihood of experiencing a housing disaster in the future, their demand for housing assets falls, which drives down house prices. Due to the substitution e¤ect, households become more willing to save in …nancial assets, which lowers the interest rate. Declining borrowing costs encourage investment and labor hiring, leading to higher wages, output and consumption. Table 5 reports the e¤ects of the disaster risk on the life-cycle consumption and saving in normal periods. As seen in the …rst row, the likelihood of having a disaster in the future induces more holdings of …nancial assets across all age groups due to the substitution e¤ect between …nancial and housing assets. The increase is especially pronounced for households in their 20s and 90s. The very young households own more …nancial wealth by bene…ting from decreased house prices as well as increased wages, as seen in Table 4 . In contrast, the very old households, who rely heavily on liquidating their housing wealth to …nance non-housing consumption, become more willing to rebalance their wealth toward …nancial assets given the downside risk in house prices. The second row of Table 5 shows that, anticipating a likely downturn in the housing market, older households would sell more of their housing assets, which drives down house prices. This, in turn, makes houses more a¤ordable to home buyers, especially those at the early stage of the life cycle. The last row of the table shows that the presence of the disaster risk increases non-housing consumption of all age groups except those in their 80s. The increase is most signi…cant for young households in their 20s and 30s, thanks to lower house prices and higher wages. To sum up, due to the substitution e¤ect, the presence of the housing disaster risk induces a resource reallocation from the housing sector to the production sector in normal periods. The resulting lower house prices, however, bene…t younger households more than the old.
In light of the above analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the housing disaster risk, one can readily explain the welfare implications found in the last subsection. From the society's perspective, although the presence of this disaster risk would result in a welfare bene…cial resource reallocation from the housing sector to the production sector in normal periods, the associated welfare gain is dominated by the welfare loss in the large recession triggered by a housing disaster due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Overall, the society would willingly devote a signi…cant amount of resources to eliminating the housing disaster risk. Meanwhile, the above analysis shows that, compared to the old, younger households su¤er less in disaster periods, due to their smaller holdings of housing assets, and they also bene…t more in normal periods from purchasing houses at lower cost, due to the incorporation of disaster risk in households'portfolio allocation decisions. This justi…es the marked asymmetry in the welfare cost evaluation of the housing disaster risk across age groups. 
Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection conducts a sensitivity analysis of the welfare cost estimation of the housing disaster risk, with results reported in Table 2 . In this analysis, except for those parameters explicitly under investigation, the rest are all maintained at their benchmark parameterization. Apparently, the analysis shows that calculating welfare costs using those alternative parameters does not signi…cantly change either the magnitude or life-cycle patterns observed in the benchmark calculation. The individual e¤ects of those parameters are presented as follows.
The …rst parameter of interest is the housing disaster probability h . Examining the impact of the parameter is especially useful because the baseline value of 3 percent as estimated from the OECD sample might be subject to some caveats. For example, the probability estimate could be biased due to a small sample problem, since house price series are not su¢ ciently long in many of the sample OECD countries. Also, the estimate is based on the assumption of parameter stability across countries, and it might thus under-or overstate country-speci…c risks depending on a country's regulatory and institutional features. 20 For this consideration, I
re-estimate the welfare costs for two di¤erent probabilities, with results reported in the second and third rows of Table 2 . Not surprisingly, a decrease in the disaster probability lowers the welfare bene…ts of eliminating the disaster risk from the perspective of either an individual age group or the society as a whole. For example, when the likelihood of having a housing disaster declines from 3 to 2 percent every year, the aggregate welfare cost of the housing disaster risk decreases from 5:24 to 4:54 percent of annual non-housing consumption. The fourth row of Table 2 shows that increasing the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion surprisingly makes the housing disaster risk less welfare costly. This is due to the fact that when households are more risk averse, they tend to allocate more of their wealth from housing to …nancial assets, leading to lower house prices and larger output and consumption in normal periods. This consequently makes housing disasters less costly for a given disaster probability. The …fth row of the table …nds that an increase in , or equivalently a decrease in IES 1= , reduces the welfare bene…ts of eliminating the housing disaster risk. This is because a decrease in IES implies that households are more averse to intertemporal ‡uctuations in consumption and thus tend to hold more …nancial assets but fewer housing assets. Similar to an increase in the disaster probability, this resource allocation alleviates the negative welfare impact of housing disasters. The sixth row of the table shows that decreasing the Cobb-Douglas aggregator of consumption goods relative to housing services raises the welfare bene…ts of removing the housing disaster risk. When households value housing services more than before, they tend to hold more housing assets and are thus more exposed to housing disaster shocks, explaining why this disaster risk becomes more welfare costly. The last row of the table shows that an increase in housing stock h has limited e¤ects on the welfare costs of the housing disaster risk, because, all else equal, increased house supply lowers house prices but leaves households'housing wealth mostly una¤ected.
In conclusion, as far as the Canadian economy is concerned, despite the rarity of housing disasters, households would be willing to give up around 5 percent of their non-housing consumption each year to eliminate this disaster risk. However, the welfare evaluation varies considerably across households, with the old bene…ting more from the elimination of the risk.
Conclusion
This paper examines the welfare cost of rare housing disasters in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model. I calibrate the likelihood and magnitude of housing disasters from historic housing market experiences in the OECD, and …nd that housing market disasters occur with a probability of 3 percent every year. The model shows that despite their rarity, the aggregate welfare cost of housing disasters is large, since Canadian households would give up around 5 percent of their non-housing consumption each year to eliminate this disaster risk. However, the welfare evaluation of this risk di¤ers considerably in magnitude across age groups, with a welfare cost as high as 10 percent of annual non-housing consumption for the old, but near zero for the young. This notable asymmetry stems from the fact that, compared to the old, younger households su¤er less from house price declines in disaster periods, due to smaller holdings of housing assets, and they bene…t more from purchasing houses at lower cost in normal periods, due to the negative e¤ect of disaster risk on house prices.
A valuable extension of this paper would be to explicitly model the causes of housing market disasters, which would improve our understanding of how to reduce the probability or impact of those events. Also interesting would be an examination of the e¤ects of time-varying housing disaster risk on the dynamics of house prices and other macroeconomic aggregates, since changes in disaster risk alone could have meaningful macroeconomic consequences. 21 Furthermore, it would be useful to consider the possible interdependence between di¤erent types of economic disasters, such as housing disasters versus income disasters, as considered in Barro (2006) , and compare their macroeconomic and welfare implications. (31) subject to the same constraints in (24) except with an arbitrary house pricep, but with the continuation value still being the one de…ned in (24) . This results in policy functions a 0 (:;p) and h 0 (:;p). Look for p t until P j j=1 j h 0 j (p t ) = h, i.e., when the housing market is exactly cleared. I conduct the price search using the secant method. The resulting policy functions a 0 (:; p t ) and h 0 (:; p t ) are then used to derive the next-period distribution t and capital stock k t+1 .
(c) Keep implementing the above procedure with the provided random draws and get a series fd h;t ; t ; k t ; p t g T t=1 based on the initial distribution 0 and capital stock k 0 obtained in step 1. Drop the …rst t 0 < T periods in order to eliminate the in ‡uence of the initial distribution and capital stock.
5. Run OLS using the simulated series fk t ; p t g T t=t 0 +1 and obtain the new set of forecasting coe¢ cients n (1)
. I separate the simulation points (k t ; k t+1 ) and (k t ; p t ) into two subsamples associated with di¤erent realizations of disaster shocks and run OLS separately. If new coe¢ cients are close enough to the previous ones, then the iteration over coe¢ cients is …nished. Otherwise, update the coe¢ cients and go back to step 3. I use a linear update formula with 
